Certain restrictions on public funding for assisted reproductive technology (ART) are articulated and defended by recourse to a distinction between medical infertility and social infertility. We propose that underlying the prioritization of medical infertility is a vision of medicine whose proper role is to restore but not to improve upon nature. We go on to mark moral responses that speak of investments many continue to make in nature as properly an object of reverence and gratitude and therein (sometimes) a source of moral guidance. We draw on the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein in arguing for the plausibility of an appeal to nature in opposition to the charge that it must contain a logical fallacy. We also invite consideration of the moral plausibility of some appeal to nature. Finally, we examine what follows in the case of ART. Should medicine respect as natural limits that should not be overcome: the need for a man and a woman in reproduction; menopause; and even declining fertility with age? We must first ask ourselves to what degree we should defer to nature in the conduct of medicine, at least in the particular if not the general case. This will involve also asking ourselves what we think is natural and in what instances and spirit might we defy nature. Divergent opinions and policies concerning who should receive ART treatment and public funding are more easily understood in view of the centrality, complexity and fundamental nature of these questions.
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[MAIN BODY]
What requests for assisted reproductive technology (ART) are worthy of medicine as a vocation and of active support from the public in the form of funding? This question is passionately debated in view of the profundity of its stakes. It is also philosophically complex, this paper demonstrates.
IDENTIFYING THE CENTRALITY OF THE 'MEDICAL'
Variations in eligibility criteria for ART treatment and funding continue to exist both in Australia and internationally. Barring certain exceptions, South Australian and Western Australian legislation require that a person be medically infertile in order to qualify for treatment.
1 By contrast, in 2008 the Australian State of Victoria amended its legislation: ART is now accessible to, among others, any woman who, without it, is unlikely to become pregnant, to carry a pregnancy or to give birth. 2 ART is thereby available to menopausal and post-menopausal women and to women without a male partner (single women and women in a same-sex relationship, for instance). Technically, however, the treatment still needs to be privately funded, as public funding, flowing from the federal and not the state government, continues to require the presence of a medical condition.
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In 2006, for instance, a federal government ART Review Committee explained that 'Medicare benefits are not payable to single women or same sex couples who access ART treatments unless they are clinically infertile'. 4 The Committee implied that this was non-discriminatory: 'Reimbursement through Medicare is dependent upon the presence of a medical condition determining a clinical need and not dependent upon partner status.' 5 The report did not challenge the prevailing arrangement whereby solely 'clinical need' warranted public reimbursement. And it considered it self-evident that such need was absent in single women and same-sex couples.
Such need has also been thought attenuated in the case of older women seeking ART. As part of their rationale for limiting ART public funding to women aged 37 and under, the Southern Health Care Region of Sweden cites 'a normal-deviant scale '. 6 This implies that infertility in older women represents less of a deviation from the norm than infertility in younger women and that, as such, older women have less need for ART.
This implicitly conceives of medicine as properly limiting itself to the correction of (burdensome) deviations from the norm.
A German survey of over 3000 people representing a range of stakeholders found three 'major normative convictions' to be 'statistically associated with support for [complete ART] public funding': (1) 'Infertility is a disease'; (2) 'Having children is a basic opportunity every human should have'; and (3) 'Infertile couples with an unfulfilled desire for children are usually in need of assisted reproduction'. 7 Indeed, the authors found it 'interesting' that:
respondents' views regarding financing ART associated with theoretical assumptions that are also key issues in the philosophical and ethical discourse on financing ART, i.e. infertility as disease, having children as basic human opportunity and assisted reproduction as a medically necessary versus non-necessary treatment. properly opposes nature only when the latter problematically deviates, declines or falters, not when we face any need whatsoever. On such a view, medicine seeks to restore nature but not to improve upon it, as it were.
Medicine does not bend nature to its every will. The content of that will is relevant and important.
Let us expanding on Phelps's riposte. Is it not odd to appeal to nature when it comes to medicine, which so often opposes nature 'taking its course'? And is it not doubly so in an area of medicine that has been variously dubbed 'assisted' and 'artificial' reproductive technology?
Indeed, the distinction between 'assisted' and 'artificial' is suggestive. Marcus Aurelius made a striking observation that we can draw on here:
Wherever it is in agreement with nature, the ruling power within us takes a flexible approach to circumstances, always adapting itself easily to both practicality and the given event. It has no favoured material for its work, but sets out on its objects in a conditional way, turning any obstacle into material for its own use. It is like a fire mastering whatever falls into it. A small flame would be extinguished, but a bright fire rapidly claims as its own all that is heaped on it, devours it all, and leaps up yet higher in consequence.
In light of its opening, this observation may accord with Pesce's implied vision for medicine. However, it may instead lend succour to one closer to Phelps's if we dare to imagine that every attempt to reproduce is in fact 'in agreement with nature'. Here a single woman and a conventional couple employ ART in a manner that equally agrees with nature to the degree that they both try to realise something perfectly natural, indeed, we may say, 'the most natural thing in the world': the call to have, rear and love young.
EXPANDING THE PARAMETERS OF THE 'NATURAL'
Aurelius articulated a vision of human ingenuity which thrives when in agreement with nature. Nature dictates that a man and a woman are required for procreation and this limitation should be acknowledged and respected because, I
contend, it discloses something of the purposes and providence of nature: that a child's best interests are served by it having a mother and a father.
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When it comes to altering the fundamentals of nature -and Frame sees as one of them a biological mother and father raising their child -we must defer to nature in the absence of certainty (or at least justified confidence).
Frame places the burden of proof on those whose position runs counter to nature, which, he suggests, we are right to take as a general guide, both prudentially and morally.
Frame warns that it can be very dangerous to interfere with -more strongly, to defy -the fundamentals of life before they are fully understood.
In this he is knowingly conservative, in the literal sense. More than this, Frame may be taken to identify a certain authority belonging to the purposes and providence that he discerns in nature. Victor Hugo offered a striking expression of awe before nature:
the contemplar falls into unfathomable ecstasies in view of all these decompositions of forces resulting in unity. All works for all.
Algebra applies to the clouds; the radiance of the star benefits the rose; no thinker would dare to say that the perfume of the hawthorn is useless to the constellations…Enormous gearing, whose first motor is the gnat, and whose last wheel is the zodiac.
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Hugo divined in nature a unity, indeed, a kind of workers' solidarity. Such reverence as he expressed for it need not depend upon some (logically antecedent) recognition (or ascription) of authority. Rather, it can be (or take the form of) just such recognition or ascription.
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As with reverence, so too with gratitude. Gratitude before nature can be precisely the recognition (or ascription) of a certain authority (connected to bounty or generosity). That most basic and universally shared practice among mortals may be to find physical sustenance in nature. Here we find the origin of the idea of 'natural goods'. Physically we spring from and depend upon nature -it is no wonder that we should ever defer to it, in gratitude as in reverence. What is more, nature rarely inspires gratitude and reverence more than it does at the conception and birth of a child. In these inspirations nature is capable of providing more than simply physical sustenance.
Accusations of the unnatural need not be merely prejudicial, as they were implied to be by Pesce's opponents (at least in that particular case).
They need not derive merely from what is often reductively mocked as the 'yuck' factor. 25 They may also derive from, among other things, the reverence and gratitude that the natural world can inspire in us and the authority to which we may thereby take ourselves to be answerable.
Christopher Cordner argues that many of our moral responses and appeals make the sense that they do against a more general background in which individuals are loved as irreplaceably unique and unconditionally valuable.
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Similarly, we argue that many appeals to defer to nature make the sense that they do against a more general background in which a certain authority is identified in nature by virtue of its capacity to inspire reverence and gratitude.
Frame's conservative approach to interfering with any perceived fundamentals of nature is shared by many on different fronts. there exists widespread moral opposition to medical efforts to radically oppose the natural ageing process, to clone human beings, and to hybridise human beings with animals. We may also note comparable opposition to the destruction of elements unique in nature, such as endangered species or ecosystems. Some intrinsic and not merely instrumental value is given to belong to the natural in this way. An authority is identified in it at least to the degree that it has some claims -they may not be decisive. In this paper we propose that nature is a very widespread and potentially profound notion capable of much more than oppression: it resides deeply and centrally in many of our lives and informs many of our moral judgements (not just the worst of them). We argue that appeals to nature, in particular those often moderating the provision and public funding of ART, are at the very least intelligible and defensible. They are so partly by reference to a range of connected and widely shared responses (reverence and gratitude) and analogous judgements (placing moral limitations on medicine).
These responses and judgements can be part of (and help to constitute) entire ways of speaking and valuing. Appeals to nature can be made -and can make the sense that they do -as part of broader ways of speaking and valuing that, we think, good faith commends not dismissing out of hand. Again, that is not to say appeals to nature need be decisive, for other concerns will compete. With reference to Wittgenstein we go on to explain what we mean by 'entire ways of speaking and valuing'. In this we explain one way in which appeals to nature can be marked out as intelligible and defensible.
APPEALS TO NATURE NEED NOT BE FALLACIOUS
The word 'natural' carries connotations as well as denotations. The very concept or, perhaps more accurately, our variegated use of the word has a normative -and very often morally normative -dimension 'built into it', as it were. Generally, it is considered good for a thing to be natural. Likewise, a good thing is often thought therein to be natural. Such thinking is considered by many to be fallacious, but one of our central aims in this paper is to argue that it need not be.
What is known as 'the appeal to nature' may indeed be a formal or logical fallacy (specifically a fallacy of relevance) to the degree that the natural and the good do not always correlate (that is, they are not perfectly synonymous). 27 What is natural may not always be good, and vice versa.
('Malaria is natural but not good', 'artificial pacemakers are good but not natural'.) However, we would argue that the natural and the good can often correlate not by force of logic alone but by force of a logic internal to (and partly constitutive of) an entire way of speaking and valuing, a certain ethical orientation or faith, for instance, with all of its associated vocabularies and webs of meaning. Here a different picture of logic is emerging. 27 The same charge might conceivably be made against any pair composed out of the beautiful, the true, the good, and the healthy. Rather, he sought to free the fly (from the 'fly-bottle', if not quite the web).
WITTGENSTEIN'S VISION OF CONCEPTS
That is, he sought to deliver us from unnecessary confusions (in terms of which he characterised much of the philosophical work that preceded him).
In answer to confusions, Wittgenstein went 'back to the round ground' of our everyday practices and locutions, back to our lives with words, in order to 'look and see' what similarities and differences existed between them. Diamond's imagery of weaving is apposite to Wittgenstein's thread simile.
Such an appeal to nature as issued above may be interwoven with a whole way of speaking and valuing (that is, a life Rhees (1905 Rhees ( -1989 Should we respect as natural limits that should not be overcome: the need for a man and a woman in reproduction; menopause; and even declining fertility with age? In each case, one judgement must follow another of how fundamental to nature is that limit. That judgement, in turn, must follow one of how fundamental to our morality is a deference to nature in this particular case. That judgement, in its turn, must follow as rich and rounded as possible an appreciation of the place and importance of the natural in our lives. Where, how, and how deeply is the natural interwoven 33 Michael Bess expresses basic support for our position when he writes "We need to...acknowledge that some distinctions [like 'x is more natural than y'] will wind up relatively straightforward and satisfying, whereas others will leave us with a frown of nervous into our lives? When do we find it morally good to defer to or, by contrast, to defy or depart from nature, and why? Does ingenuity or mercy, more than any relation to nature, more deeply define a medicine worthy of the name? Are those things themselves in some sense natural? As well as arguing for the relevance of these questions, we have tried to conduct some prefatory work toward answering them.
